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Notes
The 1991 U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement:
Will the New Approach Yield Old Results?
Timothy J. Bartl
INTRODUCTION
The United States and Japan have feuded intensely over
trade in high technology goods, especially semiconductors, for
more than twenty years. They have negotiated several times after U.S. allegations of unfair trade, illegal dumping and structurally closed markets.' In an effort to stop Japanese dumping and
increase foreign access to Japanese electronics markets, the two
countries signed a controversial five-year bilateral agreement on
July 31, 1986.2
The 1986 agreement and enforcement sanctions stopped the
dumping and mildly increased foreign market access, but crippled the U.S. electronics industry and increased chip prices
worldwide. The U.S. chip industry, however, persuaded the U.S.
government to negotiate a new five-year agreement which the
two countries signed on June 4, 1991. 3 The new agreement shifts
the attention away from stopping dumping to increasing market
'4
access and fostering "buyer-seller relationships among firms."
The U.S. government hailed the agreement as the key to developing good business relationships which will increase market ac1. CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES, How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD, 46-61 (1988) (hereinafter TRADING PLACES]. See also
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, FOUR YEARS OF EXPERIENCE UNDER
THE U.S.-JAPAN SEMICONDUCTOR AGREEMENT. "A DEAL Is A DEAL," SUMMARY, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, 6 (1990) (graphic) [hereinafter A DEAL IS A DEAL].

2.

Arrangement Between the Government of Japan and the Government

of the United States of America Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products,
July 31, 1986, reprintedin 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1409 (1986) [hereinafter

1986 Agreement].
3. Arrangement Between the Government of Japan and the Government
of the United States of America Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products,
June 4, 1991 [hereinafter 1991 Agreement] (available from the Office of the
United States Trade Representative).
4. Id. at 11(1).
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cess. 5 Others express sincere doubt about its ultimate
6
effectiveness because it lacks any enforcement measures.
The ultimate success or failure of the 1991 agreement depends on the willingness of the parties to work within it rather
than the United States forcing results through sanctions. The
U.S. industry needs reassurance from Japan that it is competing
in an open market. In return, the U.S. industry members must
show that they are reliable suppliers of high technology goods.
In 1986, the U.S. used substantial leverage to force the Japanese
to the negotiating table and then used sanctions to compel them
to abide by the agreement. U.S. leverage has diminished considerably, however, and imposing sanctions could harm the U.S.
electronics industry as much or more than that of Japan. In the
final analysis, it is the extent to which the U.S. semiconductor
firms, with the help of the 1991 agreement, overcome the barriers to the Japanese electronics market and prove themselves dependable suppliers which will determine the success of the 1991
agreement.
This Note explores the operation of both semiconductor
agreements and discusses the ingredients which may allow the
U.S. industry to improve its relations with Japan. Part I highlights the dynamics between the U.S. and Japanese semiconductor industries, and explains the operation of the 1986 agreement
and the negotiation of the 1991 agreement. Part II analyzes the
effectiveness of the new market access and antidumping provisions and discusses why sanctions imposed to enforce either section would likely be counterproductive. Part III concludes that
the success of the agreement depends upon each side adhering to
the agreement's provisions, and the ability of U.S. companies to
supply products that the Japanese users will buy. This is largely
because sanctions would now have only a limited effect in compelling Japanese compliance.
I.

A SYNOPSIS: EVENTS LEADING TO THE 1991
AGREEMENT

A.

HISTORY OF U.S.-JAPAN SEMICONDUCTOR TRADE

The U.S. electronics industry invented the semiconductor in
5. Valerie Rice, New Chip Pact Promises Wider Door To Japan, ELEc.
TRONIC Bus., Aug. 5, 1991, at 28 [hereinafter New Pact].
6. Id. at 32 (statement of Clyde Prestowitz). For a general statement of
Mr. Prestowitz's prescription for U.S. agreements with Japan, see TRADING
PLACES, supra note 1, at 306-07 (arguing that the U.S. should negotiate forcefully with Japan).
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19597 and dominated the world market until 1986.8 In 1981, Japanese manufacturers attained the market share lead in Dynamic
Random Access Memories (DRAMs or D-RAMs), the vital
memory chips needed for all computers that also act as a "technology driver" for other chips.9 The change followed the Japanese government's "targeting" of the semiconductor industry,
which started in the early 1970s. 10
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry

(MITI) implemented targeting" practices which included impos7. Semiconductors are solid state crystal devices whose electrical properties are characteristic of materials which are neither conductors nor insulators.
These electrical properties in the semiconductor materials (principally silicon)
are created through the introduction of small amounts of impurities or dopants.
The principal types of semiconductors are transistors and diodes (discrete semiconductors) and integrated circuits. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1437,
FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL TARGETING AND ITS EFFECTS ON U.S. INDUSTRIES:

PHASE

1: JAPAN 217 (1983) [hereinafter TARGETING]. This article will discuss integrated circuits only.
The integrated circuit was invented in 1958 by Texas Instruments, imbedding many formerly discrete products into microscopic circuits on a silicon chip
and revolutionizing the electronics industry. What is a Semiconductor? STANDARD & POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS, May 30, 1991, at E22.
8.

SEMICONDUCTOR

INDUSTRY

ASSOCIATION,

KEY FACTS

AND

ISSUES:

SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY BACKGROUND INFORMATION 4 (1990) [hereinafter
BACKGROUND INFORMATION].

9. DRAMs are currently one of the most important types of semiconductors because they allow computers to store and exchange data. DRAMs are
found in all computers as well as automobiles, telecommunications equipment,
and consumer electronics. Id. at 8-9. A DRAM contains thousands of memory
storage cells in which information can be stored by electrically charging them.
When the power is disconnected, all stored information is erased. COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1990 O.J. (L 193) 1 n.5. Id. See also INTEGRATED CIRCUITS: PRODUCTS FOR EVERY TASK, STANDARD & POOR'S INDUSTRY

SURVEYS, May 30, 1991, at E26 (describing different types of memory chip prod-

ucts).
Although the DRAM is not the most sophisticated type of chip, its successful design and manufacture gives a company design and manufacturing advantages in more sophisticated chips. Laurence Hooper, IBM and Siemens Report
Developing ProductionModel for New Chip Series, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19,1991,
at B4.
Currently, Japan holds near 90% of the DRAM market, the U.S., less than
10%. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 10-11.
10. TARGETING, supra note 7, at 148; BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra
note 8, at 8.
11. Targeting is defined as "[c]oordinated government actions that direct
productive resources to give domestic producers in selected industries a competitive advantage.... Targeting techniques include the selective use of home market protection, tax policies, antitrust exemptions, science and technology
assistance, and financial assistance." TARGETING, supra note 7, at 1.
After the Second World War, Japan targeted IBM and the computer industry. Japan became a full-fledged GATT member in 1965, but retained its closed
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ing stiff import barriers to discourage domestic consumption of
foreign goods, limiting foreign market share, and restricting direct foreign investment. 12 Other techniques included forcing
American firms to license products to Japanese companies instead of selling directly in the market. 13 In the licensing negotiations, MITI provided additional assistance by pressuring U.S.
companies to give extremely favorable terms to the Japanese
14
companies.
I5
After 1976, when Japan pronounced its market "open,'
the government arranged or funded cooperative research and
development (R&D) projects. l6 In these projects, MITI gathered certain semiconductor/electronics companies into a cartel
where it gave each company a specific task according to that
company's strengths. The firms not only conducted research on
new technology but also devised the most efficient manufacturing processes. 17
markets by using allowable GATT exceptions with little challenge from other
members. TRADING PLACES, supra note 1, at 196-97.
12. TRADING PLACES, supra note 1, at 148. MITI not only required IBM to
license its patents but also limited IBM's market share. This lasted in some
form until 1979. Id. at 34. See also John C. Kingery, The U.S.-Japan SemiconductorArrangement and the GATT. Operatingin a Legal Vacuum, 25 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 467, 472 (1988); Kenneth Flamm, Making New Rulew High Tech Trade
Frictionand the Semiconductor Industry, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1991, at 24.
These restraints did not stop the U.S. manufacturers from selling in Japan.
Although Japanese chip producers complained about dumping, the U.S. share
peaked at 40% of the Japanese market in 1974. Id. at 24. The Japanese government emphasized the importance of domestic companies buying Japanese parts
by denying to one manufacturer import licenses for U.S. chips it had purchased.
Id. at 24.
13. Because Japan's patent system is weaker and slower than that of the
United States, Japanese companies often infringed on U.S. patents before they
were protected. TRADING PLACES, supra note 1, at 35, 177-78.
14. Flamm, supra note 12, at 23. It is estimated that because of intervention, and because they believed themselves invincible, U.S. firms licensed $500
billion worth of patents for $9 billion. William P. Patterson, Semiconductors:
Crying Uncle, INDUS. WK., Jan. 16, 1989, at 42. Other subtle protection included
promoting specialization among manufacturers and providing low interest or
conditional loans to companies. See Kingery, supra note 12, at 472.
15. TRADING PLACES, supra note 1, at 148.
16. TARGETING, supra note 7, at 148. The most celebrated of these was the
Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) project. The project combined Japan's top
five semiconductor producers and MITI's electrotechnical lab in a research project to develop the technology, manufacturing processes, and equipment to
manufacture DRAMs of greater densities (ones that could store more data).
From this project, the Japanese introduced the 64K DRAM six months ahead of
U.S. firms. Further, the government held 5% of the patents developed in the
project and licensed them to the companies for free. Id. at 149.
17. Thomas R. Howell, Foreign Cartels and American Competitiveness,in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: THE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE, 16-1, 16-13 to -14.
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MITI chose electronics companies which were already part
of financially linked networks known as keiretsu (economic
groups) to lead the electronics revolution.' The companies vertically integrated their chip production into their other manufacturing operations, allowing them to manufacture both
component parts and finished products.' 9 These conglomerates
survived difficult economic times better than their fragmented
and much smaller American competitors because the large
banks within the keiretsu provided financing at lower interest
20
rates.
In the early 1980s, these companies channelled funds into
building state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities in which to use
the government-sponsored technology. 2' This expanded production capacity led to overproduction of memory chips, 22 in part to
win over American computer manufacturers 23 by dumping high
(John H. Jackson et al. eds., 1985). This "division of labor" approach to research
allows many firms to introduce products more cheaply than if they act alone.
Howell estimates that Japanese companies would have spent five times as much
on R&D if each had worked separately, without the VLSI project. Id. In contrast, U.S. antitrust law allows domestic companies to work together only until
prototypes are developed. Id. at 16-15. MITI also provided 40% in additional
funding over the industry's contribution for this project. Flamm, supra note
12, at 25.
18. TRADING PLACES, supra note 1, at 157. There are approximately six
major groups of this type in Japan. Each tries to have a major company in each
sector of the economy. The groups usually include banking, insurance, trading,
steel, electronics, glass, oil, etc. The system thrives on cross-shareholding,
through which group members hold 25-40% of each other's stock. This prevents
the threat of takeovers and impatient shareholders, allowing managers to focus
on long-term strategy instead of short-term financial performance. Id.
19. Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, The United States Semiconductor Accord of
1986: The Shortcomings of High-Tech Protectionism, 13 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE, 179, 181 (1989). This provided an immediate market for their chips, allowing Japanese companies a smoother "ramp-up" (initial production) period.
Id.
20. Id.
In addition, Japanese Semiconductor Companies belong to huge conglomerates. The major banks that head these organizations are ready
sources of low interest R&D funds. Japanese semiconductor companies reinvest twice as much as a percentage of sales in manufacturing
technology as their U.S. counterparts and about ten percent more on
semiconductor research and development.
Id. Readily available internal funding remains a substantial advantage for the
Japanese. General Developments: U.S. Losing Competitive Edge in World
Marke4 Offwial Says, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1508 (1991). But see Akio
Mikuni, Japan'sCrash Will Open Its Economy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8,1992, at A10
(arguing crash of Japan's bubble economy will undo keiretsu).
21. Flamm, supra note 12, at 25.
22. See Howell, supra note 17, at § 16-14.
23.

See BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 10. Hitachi's U.S.
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quality chips at low prices. 24 These actions and a slowing chip
market severely undercut U.S. producers.e
U.S. semiconductor manufacturers complained that the Japanese government's favoritism toward its semiconductor industries constituted an unfair trade practice and filed a section 301
complaint 8 through its representative body, the Semiconductor
Industry Association (SIA). 27 Two private American companies
salespeople were guaranteed profits and told to lower chip prices in ten percent
increments until they won certain American accounts. Id. The famed "Hitachi
Memo" led to a congressional inquiry and much public fanfare over the "loss"
of the semiconductor industry to the Japanese. See U.S.-Japan Trade: Semiconductors, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade, Productivity and Economic Growth, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-24 (1985) (correspondence between
Hitachi and Congress over memo).
24. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 15. See also Dallmeyer,
supra note 19, at 187 ("Dumping refers to the practice of selling goods in an
export market at prices below those in the home market."); John D. Barcello
III, Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 494
(1972). If the dumping country protects its markets, the dumping company can
charge higher prices in its domestic market and use the profit to subsidize
dumping in foreign markets. Id. at 499-502. Japan in effect did this but over a
term of ten years. The Trade Act of 1974, as it existed in 1985 defined dumping
as selling below fair value (sales at less than fair value) or when foreign market
value is above U.S. price, 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), so here
there was little question Japanese companies were dumping. See also JOHN H.
JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC RELATIONS, 678 (2d ed. 1986).
Dumping caused a rapid exit of six of eight major U.S. DRAM manufacturers. See A DEAL IS A DEAL, supra note 1, at 15. For example, Hewlett-Packard
pleaded with its American suppliers to increase their quality. When the U.S.
manufacturers did not comply, the company began using the higher-quality
Japanese chips. Patterson, supra note 14, at 43-44.
25. Dallmeyer, supra note 19, at 180.
26. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-16 (1988), allows
private industry, the United States Trade Representative or the president to
initiate an investigation of unfair trade practices such as lack of access to foreign markets and harmful foreign trade activities. It is essentially a tool which
uses threats and feints to relieve protectionist pressures through negotiations
and consultations with the offending country. There are four ways to allege a
substantive violation: if the action is (1) a violation of an international trade
agreement; (2) unjustifiable; (3) unreasonable (nullifies or impairs a benefit,
including market access); and (4) a discriminatory practice. Bart S. Fisher &
Ralph G. Steinhardt III, Section 301 of the TradeAct of 1974: Protectionfor U.S.
Faportersof Goods, Services and Capital,14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 569, 575-78
(1982), reprintedin JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 24, at 804-08. See generally
Judith Hippler Bellow & Alan F. Holmer, Current Developments: US. Trade
Law & Policy Series #10: Significant Recent Developments in § 301 Unfair
Trade Cases, 21 INT'L LAw. 211, 211-16, 230-32 (1987).
27. Dallmeyer, supra note 19, at 188; James W. Prendergast, Recent Development, The European Economic Community's Challenge to the U.S.-Japan
Semiconductor Arrangement, 19 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 579, 582 (1987).
The Semiconductor Industry Association [hereinafter SIA] was founded in
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and the International Trade Administration (ITA) each filed
separate complaints alleging dumping of 64 kilobit28 (64K)
DRAMs, all Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories
(EPROMs), 9 and 256K and above DRAMs, respectively.3° The
massive dumping duties which the government would have levied on the Japanese chip companies supplied the pressure
needed to 31conclude the 1986 U.S.-Japan Semiconductor
Agreement.
1977 and includes all major American producers of semiconductors. It is the
lobby group for semiconductor manufacturers. Semiconductor Industry Association & Computer Systems Policy Project, Toward a New U.S.-Japan Agreement on Semiconductor Trade 4 (1991) (unpublished memorandum, copy on file
with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade) [hereinafter SIA-CSPP Joint
Memorandum].
28. A kilobit is 1,024 bits. A bit is the smallest unit of electronic binary
code which provides instructions to the microprocessor. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 26.
29. An EPROM is another type of memory chip that has permanent storage capabilities which can be erased by ultraviolet light. Id. at 25.
30. Micron Technology filed an antidumping complaint on 64K DRAMS
against seven Japanese firms. It alleged that less than fair value (LTFV) sales
resulted in loss of profits and layoffs. As a result of the complaint, the International Trade Commission (ITC) found material injury and Commerce assessed
antidumping duties of between 11.87% and 35.34%. Dallmeyer, supra note 19,
at 192.
Three manufacturers filed an antidumping case on all capacity EPROMs.
(256K EPROMs had fallen from $17 to $4 within an eight month period.) The
ITC confirmed undercutting by the Japanese and dramatic income losses for
U.S. producers and imposed dumping duties of up to 111%. Id.
Although the ITA may initiate a petition on its own under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673a(a)(1)(B), it rarely does so. The ITA did, however, initiate its own investigation of DRAMs of at least 256K. This unusual step emphasizes the significance which the United States placed on the Japanese actions and underscores
the vulnerable condition of the U.S. industry. Id. at 190-93. The 1986 agreement
suspended the uncompleted ITA investigation.
31. Kingery, supra note 12, at 474-78. Kingery discusses four options available to the U.S. at this time to combat dumping: allow antidumping procedures
to work; use the GATT Antidumping Code; ask for a dispute resolution panel
under GATT Article XXIII; or implement a bilateral agreement. With all but
the last option, the amount of time required for a formal investigation would
have allowed further erosion of the U.S. industry. Also, the timing difference
between the initial Japanese action and the subsequent effect on trade made
proving the case difficult. Id. See also Richard 0. Cunningham, The Current
State of U.S. Import Relief Laws-Increased Importance and Increased Complexity, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY, THE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE,
§ 1.04[5] at 1-14 (John H. Jackson et al. eds., 1985). For a discussion of the timing problem, see, e.g., Dallmeyer, supra note 19, at 195; Howell, supra note 17, at
16-8.
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THE 1986 AGREEMENT

The first semiconductor agreement

2

affected three main

areas in semiconductor trade. First, the United States agreed to
suspend the section 301 investigation and the three dumping
cases.33 Second, both countries agreed to increase market access
opportunities for U.S. and other foreign manufacturers.3 Third,
Japan agreed to prevent dumping in the United States and in
third country markets.35
The parties to the agreement drafted the market access provisions to assist U.S. firms to achieve a market share commensurate with their competitiveness in other markets where barriers
to trade did not exist.se The provisions also mandated that the
Japanese government create an organization to help U.S. companies establish sales, to make quality checks of U.S. chips, and to
32. 1986 Agreement, supra note 2.
33. 1986 Agreement, supra note 2, at 1410; Prendergast, supra note 27, at
583-84. Section 301 allows the trade representative to suspend its investigation
if a satisfactory bilateral agreement is reached. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
The suspension agreement on 256K and above DRAMs had little impact
because the ITA never finished its investigation and by the time of the agreement most U.S. producers had left the market, giving little reason for the Japanese to dump.
EPROMs were a different story. The countries signed the agreement
before the U.S. industry lost all of its lead. Although the ITA had not finished
the investigation at the time the agreement was signed, the U.S. firms petitioned the ITC to complete the investigation, which it did, assessing duties from
60.1% to 188%. Thus, if any dumping occurred on any type of EPROM (the
scope of the investigation), Commerce could assess the duties immediately. See
U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PuB. No. 1927, ERASABLE PROGRAMMABLE READ
ONLY MEMORIES FROM JAPAN. INVESTIGATION No. 731-TA-288 (FINAL) 2, a-23

(1986).
34. 1986 Agreement, supra note 2, at 1411.
35. Id. at 1412.
36. Today U.S. chip manufacturers still routinely outsell their Japanese rivals in markets outside Japan, holding a 56% percent share as opposed to the
22% Japanese companies hold. Stephen K. Yoder, U.S. Chips Makers Rail
Against Japanese, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1992, at B1. This statistic must be read
in light of the fact that Japan is the world's largest consumer of semiconductor
chips, constituting over 38.7% of total global consumption. Semiconductor Industry Association, World Semiconductor Trade Statistics Forecast (unpublished document, copy on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade)
[hereinafter SIA, WSTS Forecast].
Japanese business structures generally make breaking in difficult. In addition to the financial keiretsu, supplier ties and distribution groups also exist.
Vertical keiretsu cover a single industry or a group of closely related industries
(like electronics) in which set business relationships exist, making entry difficult. Finally, distribution keiretsu contain a complex linkage of retailers and
wholesalers. The Japanese government has acquiesced in these practices. Japan: Industry Groups Lukewarm on SII Pac4 Urge Tougher Trade Action
Against Japan,6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 573 (1991).
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organize a research fellowship program and seminars for foreign

firms.3 7 The parties advocated long-term ties between U.S. producers and Japanese users, and the U.S. manufacturers received
access to all Japanese government-sponsored research.-3 In addition to the official agreements, the parties signed a "secret"
9
side letter setting a target U.S. market share at 20% by 1991.3
The antidumping section, the focus of the agreement, required each country to maintain significant data on chip imports,
exports and sales. The agreement established an elaborate price
and cost monitoring system in which Japanese electronics manufacturers would submit to MITI manufacturing cost and price
data of semiconductors exported to the United States.4° MITI
would transmit the data to the Department of Commerce (Commerce) each quarter, and Commerce would calculate company41
specific foreign market value (FMV) for each product.
If Commerce detected any shipments coming into the
United States at less than company-specific fair value (i.e.,
dumping), it would show MITI its evidence and request consultations to resolve the problem.4 2 MITI, in return, agreed "to use
37. 1986 Agreement, supra note 2, at 1410 ( 3(1)-(2)).
38. Id. The parties also recognized the need to "refrain from policies or
programs which stimulate inordinate increases in semiconductor production capacity." Id. This very problem had led to Japanese dumping in the first place.
See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Dallmeyer, supra note 19, at 196 n.145; Flamm, supra note 12,
at 23. The U.S. now openly acknowledges the existence of the market share
letter. See Japan: U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Pact Negotiations Continue to
Stick on Issue of Market Share, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 618 (1991) [hereinafter
Pact Negotiations Stick]:
A disputed side letter to the 1986 agreement calls for the 20 percent
foreign share of Japan's market by the expiration of the agreement in
July 1991. The United States has maintained that Japan agreed to
guarantee the 20% share while Japan insists it only agreed to support
the U.S. goal.
I& Clyde Prestowitz explains that secret side letters are a favorite device the
Japanese government uses to grant a trade concession while publicly denying
any such agreement existed. They also allow MITI to retain control of the industry. TRADING PLACES, supra note 1, at 65.
The 20% number was drawn from a study done by Finan and Associates
which concluded that in the absence of barriers to the Japanese market, the
U.S. market share would be between 24% and 40%. Id. at 64 n.33.
40. 1986 Agreement, supra note 2, at 1411. The pact required Japanese
companies to track 35 different types of data such as production costs, shipping
and discounts. Id.
41. Id. at 1427; Dallmeyer, supra note 19, at 195-97. Commerce valued the
Japanese chips by taking the weighted-average cost and adding an 8% profit for
each product over the period reported. 1986 Agreement, supra note 2, at 1426
(Appendix, Monitoring of Sales to the United States, Classification $ J.).
42. 1986 Agreement, supra note 2, at 1411.

MINN.

J.

GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. I:III

all power within its means" to keep export floor prices at the
level set by Commerce. 43 The implied understanding was that
MITI would use administrative guidance in addition to more
conventional law to keep exports at the foreign market value.
The agreement would only accomplish its dumping goals by
controlling Japanese sales to distributors in third countries
which could in turn sell illegally to U.S. firms in the gray market and avoid the enforcement sanctions. Thus, the agreement
also directed Japan to monitor all exports from manufacturers
to third countries." Japan used questionable export controls to
prevent less-than-fair-value sales to third countries. The controls did, nonetheless, prevent direct dumping and downstream
45
dumping from third country markets.

C.

EFFECTS OF THE 1986 AGREEMENT

The 1986 agreement caused concern in the United States,
Japan, and the world market. The FMV system hurt U.S. chip
consumers who had to pay high prices for Japanese chips, while
Japanese export and production measures increased chip prices
worldwide. The European Community filed a case with the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The market
access provisions, however, did help U.S. producers increase
sales in Japan. This section reviews these elements, all of which
played an important role in the 1991 agreement.
1.

The Antidumping Provisions-Effects on Japan and the
United States

Japanese producers reacted to the agreement initially by
dumping into third country markets the chip surplus which remained from the preceding years' overexpansion. 46 The United
States threatened sanctions to stop the third country dumping
43. Id. at 1412. Because semiconductor production is a precise procedure,
companies must correct manufacturing flaws at the initial stages of mass pro-

duction. As these flaws are corrected, costs of production decrease substantially. This phenomenon is known as the "learning curve effect." Because
producers know costs will decline (usually quickly), they will price their prod-

ucts lower than current marginal costs and recoup lost profits as those costs
decline. Flamm, supra note 12, at 27 (contending that Commerce ignored these
factors in setting fair value prices).
44. 1986 Agreement, supra note 2, at 1412 ( III. (3)(1-2)).
45. See Prendergast, supra note 27, at 587 n.57. Downstream dumping occurs when third countries use dumped components such as semiconductors to
produce downstream products, such as computers, at lower prices than manufacturers in the competing country can. Id
46. Dallmeyer, supra note 19, at 197-99.
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(which undercut semiconductor manufacturers) and to compel
Japanese compliance with the agreement's market access
provisions.
Shortly before the United States took action, MITI directed
Japanese chip manufacturers to cut back production by 32% in
order to dry up the gray market and avoid sanctions.47 In April

1987, however, President Reagan followed through and imposed
$300 million in sanctions intended to avoid injuring U.S. producers or users. 48 By mid-1987, however, the U.S. computer industry rebounded, and demand for DRAMs in the U.S. increased by
30% just as the supply of Japanese DRAMs plummeted. 49 The
U.S. prices for DRAMs then jumped to levels far above the price
floors set by Commerce, causing panic over a likely chip
shortage. 5° Washington dropped $135 million from the sanctions
The [Japanese] semiconductor manufacturers needed to get rid of
huge inventories of these components so that prices would begin to rise
again. This need to reduce inventory along with a desire to maintain
good customer relations and to maintain market share, led to widespread smuggling of low-cost semiconductors from Japan to third countries. In the third country, suppliers would repackage the components
and ship them to U.S. customers who paid 20 to 40 percent less than the
prices set by Commerce under the Accord.
Id. at 197-98 (citing WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1987, at 1).
The term "gray market" is used to describe the trade in chips smuggled to
third countries, thereby avoiding the Japanese legal controls. Public criticism
from the U.S. user industries complaining about the high prices of DRAMs may
have encouraged Japanese firms to continue dumping. See Jeff Moad, Clash of
Chip, Systems Vendors Led to Sanctions Compromise, DATAMATION, June 1,
1987, at 17.
47. See George Gilder, How the Computer Companies Lost Their Memories,
FORBES, June 13, 1988, at 79, 81 [hereinafter Memories]. MITI issued forecasts
which prompted manufacturers to reduce production in line with the forecasts.
MITI did not provide company-specific forecasts. See Japan-Tradein Semiconductors, BISD 35th Supp. 116 (1989),
17, 27 (GATT panel report adopted
May 4, 1988). Japanese semiconductor executives subsequently complained of
MITI requiring 50% production controls after the U.S. imposed sanctions. See
Jack Robertson, JapaneseExecutives Cool to Access Goals of U.S., ELECTRONIC
NEws, June 15, 1987, at 43 [hereinafter JapaneseExecutives Cool to Goals].
48. Sanctions were imposed on 16-bit laptop and desktop computers, 18-,
19-, and 20-inch television receivers and displays, and rotary drills, grinders and
sanders. Jack Robertson, Tariffs Held to 16-bit CPUs, TV; Drives, T&M Escape,
ELECTRONIC NEws, Apr. 20, 1987, at 1. Of the total, $135 million penalized Japan for continued dumping, and $165 million were imposed for lack of market
access. Dallmeyer, supra note 19, at 203. The Reagan Administration tried to
design the sanctions largely so that they would not affect U.S. chip or computer
manufacturers. See, e.g., Jack Robertson, Move Micro Sanctions, ELECTRONIC
NEws, Aug. 21, 1989, at 10.
49. Memories, supra note 47, at 81.
50. Dallmeyer, supra note 19, at 204-05. Several reasons existed for the low
quantities. MITI's production controls, which prompted major manufacturers
to cut production by 50%, remained a dominant reason through November 1987.
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after six months, satisfied that all dumping had ceased.5 1
Though the agreement's price increase mechanisms for
EPROMs resuscitated the industry,5 2 those designed to allow
American chip producers to compete in the DRAM market
failed. By the time of the agreement, only two U.S. manufacturers making DRAMS existed s and, by the time the United States
imposed sanctions, only one U.S. DRAM-only manufacturer,
holding a minor market share, remained. 54
In Japan, the rigorous production controls MITI imposed to
dry up the gray market fostered cooperation between the once
adversarial chip producers. Instead of engaging in blood-letting
competition, the firms united to raise prices and to share oligopolistic profits.5 This price cooperation forced U.S. computer
Also, American Telephone and Telegraph, which produced exclusively for itself, left the DRAM market just before the demand explosion in mid-1987.
Memories, supra note 47, at 81; JapaneseExecutives Cool to Goals, supra note
47, at 43.
51. Dumping had largely stopped by late May, prompting President Reagan to lift $51 million of the sanctions on June 9, 1987. Gerald M. Boyd, Reagan
in Venice, Lifts Partof Tariff on Japan,N.Y. TIMEs, June 9, 1987, at Al, see
also Jack Robertson, Accuse Japan of Dumping ASICs, MPUs, ELECTRONIC
NEws, May 25, 1987, at 4. Some reports of dumping in the gray market continued through August. Gray Marketfor Semiconductors Still Exists in Taiwan,
Comline News Service, Aug. 17, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CMPCOM File. Commerce lifted the remaining $84 million in antidumping
sanctions on November 2, 1987. Commerce Undersecretaryfor International
Trade Announces Semiconductor Progress, PR Newswire, Nov. 2, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CMPCOM File. Prices remained high into 1989.
See Patterson, supra note 14, at 42.
52. Note that the agreement did allow U.S. EPROM manufacturers to retain their lead. See infra, notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
53. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 4. By 1985, all U.S. companies except for Micron Technology and Texas Instruments had abandoned the
256K DRAM.
In hindsight, the ineffective antidumping section actually worked to the
advantage of the Japanese. The high quality and extremely low price of Japanese DRAMs drove most U.S. manufacturers out of the market before the
countries signed the agreement. Thus, the pact was protecting a non-existent
U.S. DRAM industry. Dallmeyer, supra note 19, at 202; See also Japan's
Chipmakers: Falling off the Learning Curve, ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 1991, at 64.
54. Micron Technology, the only remaining DRAM-only producer in 1986,
had filed the 64K antidumping complaint. Jack Robertson, Semiconductor
(Dis)Agreement, ELECTRONIC NEws, Sept. 22, 1986, at 14. IBM still made
DRAMs during this period but did so for internal use only. By 1988 Texas Instruments had entered into a joint venture with Japanese companies. Jonathan
Matzkin, Pipeline, PC, Sept. 13, 1988, at 40.
55. Memories, supra note 47, at 81. Japanese manufacturers had suffered
$4 billion in losses due to overexpansion in their quest to gain market share.
The U.S. DRAM users effectively refunded profits which the Japanese semiconductor industry lost trying to enter the U.S. market. Id.
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manufacturers to buy DRAMs at exorbitant prices while the
Japanese domestic price remained much lower for the same
chips.s- Further, the conglomerates enhanced their competitive
position by applying the profits to R&D and capital investment
for new product development. 57 To avoid the sanctions on computers and the floor prices on semiconductors, some companies
such as Toshiba and NEC moved production to the United States
or the United Kingdom.s
In the United States, the prices of chips subject to the FMV
prices increased initially to three and four times the pre-agreement prices. 59 After the United States imposed sanctions and
MITI instituted its production controls, some prices jumped
eight-fold.s ° Both the agreement and the price increases
shocked computer manufacturers and other DRAM users. The
users lashed out at the U.S. government and the SIA for not notifying them prior to the negotiations, 6 1 and for the government's lack of foresight concerning how the agreement would
affect them.6 2 The resulting DRAM shortages6 also caused sev56. Id. However, before the 1987 price controls were lifted, even Japanese
manufacturers complained that they should be allowed to produce for the market, at least inside Japan. U.S. manufacturers put Japanese users on allocation
during the price controls as well, filling U.S. orders at the expense of Japanese
orders. See, e.g., Japanese Executives Cool to Goals, supra note 47, at 42 (statement of Tadahiro Sekimoto, President of NEC Corp.).
57. Memories, supra note 47, at 81. "During the mid-1980s the Japanese
chipmakers lost some $4 billion as they overexpanded production and dumped
the excess in the U.S. But today, as a result of MITI-ordered cutbacks and
higher DRAM prices, Japanese manufacturers are making huge margins on the
product and funding big R&D programs designed to close the U.S. lead in stateof-the art microchips and design tools." Id,
58. Toshiba moved some of its personal computer manufacturing operations to the U.S. to avoid the 100% tariff which remained on computers using
"high-performance" chips. Mitch Betts, Tariffs Remain a Thorn in U.S., Japan
Sides, COMPUTERWoRLD, Nov. 16, 1987, at 105. NEC increased its chip manufacturing capacity at its plant in Scotland to avoid the FMV prices. NEC to Start
Producing I Mbit DRAM in the UK, Comline News Service, Aug. 26, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CMPCOM File.
59. Semiconductor (Dis)Agreement,supra note 54, at 14.
60. Moad, supra note 46, at 17. The jump probably resulted from the 50%
Japanese production controls taking effect. See Japanese Executives Cool to
Goals, supra note 47, at 1.
61. Moad, supra note 46, at 17-18 (quoting Stephen Schmidt, Vice President
of Operations at Tandem Computers, Inc.: "[t]he first indication Tandem had
was when some of our suppliers said DRAM prices were going to go up by two,
three, four, or in some cases eight times.").
62. Id.at 18. The article refers to the 1986 agreement as the secret arrangement. There is no indication in any source that the government accounted for
the effect on user industries. There isalso debate as to whether the SIA alerted
any user groups. Id.
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eral delays in introductions of new machines and reduced revenues at computer companies. 64 The increases in chip prices in
turn raised prices to ultimate consumers, causing them to delay
computer purchases until prices dropped.65
The 1987 sanctions imposed on 16-bit microprocessors and
data processing equipment caused additional problems for computer and equipment manufacturers. All imported microcomputers with higher level processors66 fell victim to the tariff,
hurting companies such as IBM and Zenith that imported computers with those processors. In a controversial ruling, the U.S.
Customs Service classified printed circuit boards (PCBs) with
complete data processing ability as data processing equipment
instead of computer parts. 67 The ruling made the circuit boards,
also imported by many domestic companies, subject to 100% tariffs, and set up a major confrontation between Commerce, the
Treasury Department and the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR). 68 The ruling stood, but some U.S. and
63. In addition to the 50% production cutbacks, a natural disaster at a
Hitachi factory, Memories, supra note 47, at 81, and the changeover in memory
generations from 256K to 1Mb also affected quantities and prices. Matzkin,
supra note 54, at 40.
64. Memories, supra note 47, at 81. Examples include five-month backlogs
for a powerful Sun Microsystems workstation, the delay of Hewlett Packard's
386 desktop personal computer, and new network cards from Apple Computer.
Id. Sun's spokesperson said in the fall of 1988, "[t]he principal constraint we are
under is a shortage of DRAM, not a shortage of business." Matzkin, supra note
54, at 40.
The chip shortage which developed in mid-1987 lasted until mid-1989 when
demand for computers fell. Move Micro Sanctions,supra note 48, at 10. When
the price of DRAMs fell again, many computer companies had large inventories
of overvalued chips, causing further losses. See, e.g., APPLE COMPUTER, INC.,
1988 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (1989).
65. Matzkin, supra note 54, at 40. According to a PC MagNet survey, 15%
of respondents said they would wait to purchase new machines until after
DRAM prices fell to a reasonable level. Id.
The cost of memory chips increased to nearly 50% of a microcomputer's
total costs. Id. See also Memories, supra note 47, at 82.
66. Jack Robertson, MITI's Yankee Accent, ELECTRONIC NEws, Aug. 24,
1987, at 6 (decrying U.S. dependence on Japan). The lower-level Intel 80/86 and
80/88 chips were exempted from import sanctions, but the higher-level 80286
and 80386 processors, and the Motorola equivalents, were subject to 100% tariffs. Id.
67.

Mitch Betts, Industry Battling Parts Tariff,COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 10,

1987, at 71.
68. U.S. Trade Rep Opposes Customs Ruling, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Nov. 2,
1987, at 4. In making its determination, Commerce stressed that if the United
States allowed PCBs (motherboards) to enter sanction-free, the Japanese could
avoid the impact of the sanctions completely. Id. The SIA, Computer and Busi-
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Japanese firms avoided the tariffs nonetheless. 69
2.

Effects of the Antidumping Provisions-Europe

Many countries with significant chip user industries feared
that the agreement effectively created a semiconductor price
cartel between the United States and Japan. 70 The European
Community (EC) was especially fearful because it had a large
electronics manufacturing industry but produced only a small
percentage of its semiconductors. 71 The United States and Japan produce 80% of the world's chips; a price cartel between
these two countries could put control of the EC's electronics industries in the chip suppliers' hands.72 After unsuccessful consultations during which the EC tried to persuade the parties to
rescind the agreement, 73 the EC requested a GATT panel to determine whether Japan's methods of implementing the agreement violated GATT.
The EC claimed that several aspects of Japanese enforcement breached GATT. First, the export licensing system effectively increased the price of semiconductors to third country
markets.7 4 Second, MITI's use of administrative guidance (i.e.,
encouraging executives of major semiconductor producers to follow MITI-generated supply-demand forecasts) 75 had the effect
ness Equipment Manufacturers' Association (CBEMA), and the American Electronics Association (AEA) all teamed up to oppose the ruling.

Ironically, one part of the SIA letter questioned the strong support for
the Customs ruling by the Commerce Department, -an agency which
SIA has lobbied extensively in its continuing trade dispute with Japan.... [SIA President Andrew] Procassini wrote [in his letter to

Commerce] "SIA is seriously concerned about reports that Customs
may have been influenced by a concern that to decide otherwise would
jeopardize the effectiveness of the current sanctions. To the extent
that this view played a part in your decision, SIA urges you to
reconsider."
Id. The SIA had to lobby for the user industries or risk losing their support in
Washington, D.C. Id.
69. To get around the tariffs, Japanese companies would import PCBs with
enough chips removed to be classified as computer parts rather than data
processors. Then, the American importers would add the missing chips and assemble the computers. See Move Micro Sanctions,supra note 48, at 10.
70. See Kingery, supra note 12, at 488.
71. Id. at 482.
72. See Dallmeyer, supra note 19, at 200 n.169.
73. The EC requested consultations under GA7I Article XXII:I. GATT
doc. L/6129 (notification of consultations), cited in Japan-Tradein Semi-conductors, BISD 35th Supp. 116 (1989),
1, 33 (GA7T panel report adopted May
4, 1988) [hereinafter Panel Report].
74. Panel Report, supra note 73, 33.
75. Id. 1 40. The panel report recognized that the supply-demand forecasts
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of controlling production quantities, export prices, and export
quantities, and thus world prices of semiconductors. 76 Third, the
agreement violated Most Favored Nation7 7 principles by giving
the United States a market access advantage. 78 Finally, the EC
claimed that MITI's measures lacked transparency and thus violated Article X of GATT. 79
After examining the Japanese monitoring scheme and a position paper in which Japan stated it had instituted production
guidelines to curb third country dumping, s ° the panel determined that two portions of the Japanese monitoring system violated GATT. First, MITI's export monitoring measures
unnecessarily restricted exports based on price.8 ' While Japanese companies' compliance with the guidance was technically
voluntary, the panel found that the measures violated Article
went out to all major manufacturers of semiconductors. Id. 1 26-27. MITI provided an explanation to the panel:
Since the supply and demand imbalance in the domestic market was
harmful to the [semiconductor] sector and because some of the sales at
cheap prices might be regarded as dumping, MITI had revised its quarterly supply and demand forecast in February 1987 and had communicated its expectation to manufacturers that they should produce in
reasonable volumes to restore the domestic supply and demand
balance.

Id

40.

76. The EC contended that these measures amounted to an Article XI:I
35.
violation because they restricted exports. Id
77. Most Favored Nation is a term defined in GATT Article I. Article I
states in pertinent part:
[A]ny advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT art. I:1.
78. Panel Report, supra note 73, $ 35.
79. Id. 64. GATT Article X:1 states in pertinent part:
Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to
... prohibitions on imports or exports... or affecting their sale, distribution ... or other use, shall be published promptly in such a manner
as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them.
80. See Kenneth Flamm, Semiconductors, in EUROPE 1992: AN AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVE 225, 250 (Gary Hufbauer, ed., Brookings Institution 1990). The paper from the Japanese government to the United States government tried to
persuade the Reagan Administration to not impose previously announced sanctions. Id.; see also PanelReport, supra note 73, 33 (citing Japanese opposition).
81. Id. 117. "The Panel considered that the complex of measures exhibited the rationale as well as the essential elements of a formal system of export
control." Id.
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because (1) "sufficient incentives ... existed for [the] nonmandatory measures to take effect";83 and (2) operation of measures to restrict exports at below market prices depended on government action or intervention.8 4 Second, paperwork delays of
up to three months in processing export licenses for third countries, which was another element of MITI's solution to third
country dumping, also constituted restrictions on exportation.85
While the EC argued at the GATT that Japan was deliberately increasing the price of semiconductors (which hurt its computer manufacturers), it was simultaneously investigating
charges that Japanese chip companies were dumping in the EC
(which hurt its developing chip industry).8 The negotiations
following the investigation resulted in an arrangement between
the Commission of the European Communities and Japan similar to the 1986 agreement. The Commission asked Japan to ensure "undertakings" that sales prices in the EC would not fall
below a floor price level calculated as a weighted-average production cost plus 9.5% profit margin.8 7 This demonstrates the
X82

82. In Japan-Restrictionson Imports of Certain Agricultural Products,
BISD 35th Supp. 163 (1989) (GATT panel report adopted Mar. 22, 1988), the
panel recognized administrative guidance as an effective governmental measure
capable of enforcing supply restrictions even though compliance was not legally

binding.
83.

PanelReport, supra note 73, 1 109. According to the panel, part of the

incentive consisted of upholding Japan's end of the agreement: if Japanese producers did not reduce their production, Japan would not fulfill its undertaking
to the U.S. Id 1 110. The Japanese producers conformed to the 1986 agreement
because they had a strong interest in reduced trade tensions between Japan and
the United States (continued semiconductor sales) and MITI's strong administrative controls allowed it to pinpoint any manufacturer that did not conform.

IS 11 110-11.

84. Id. 109. The panel concluded that the amount of information the government required the producers to submit allowed MITI to pinpoint which
company violated the guidance. Also private firms and government representatives worked together in the Supply and Demand Forecasts Committee to reduce output. Id.
112-14.
85. Id. at 1 118. While the panel found that Japanese implementation of
the Agreement violated GATT, most commentators agree that such arrangements prima facie violate GATT but may fall within certain exceptions. See,
e.g., John H. Jackson, Consistency of Export RestraintArrangements with the
GATT, 11 WoRLD ECON. 485, 491 (1988).
86. The original dumping complaint was made in February 1987 by the European Electronic Component Manufacturers' Association (EECMA, the European counterpart to SIA). 1990 O.J. (L 20) 1. In a period from 1983 to 1987,
Japan increased its market share in DRAM from 24.6% to 70.5%. Id. at 89.
The Japanese dumping margins ranged from 8.5% to 206.2% below cost of production. Id. 1 78.
87. 1990 O.J. (L 20) 25-26. The provisional "undertakings" were made final
in Council Regulation Ne 2112/90 of 23 July 1990 imposing a definitive an-
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strong likelihood that Japanese companies dumped chips into
the third major semiconductor market, not just in the U.S.
3.

Japan and the United States-Market Access

Although foreign producers never reached the goal of 20%
market share, the market share provisions of the agreement accomplished far more than the antidumping provisions. Foreign
market share increased from 8.5% in 1986 to nearly 13.5% in
1 9 9 1 .88 By mid-1989, the five major Japanese electronics firms
(Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, Mitsubishi and Toshiba) were purchasing 20% of their semiconductor input from foreign suppliers,8 9
and U.S. and Japanese companies had started several joint ventures.90 The SIA and the Electronics Industry Association of Jatidumping duty on imports of DRAMs originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional duty. 1990 O.J. (L 193) 5-6.
Europe's computer manufacturers complained immediately that Japan had
stopped dumping long before the initial investigation and instead invested in
new plant there. In addition, Japanese chip producers reaped the increased
profits which flowed as a result of the price floors. Unda Bernier, DRAM Price
Agreement Helps JapanMore Than Europe, ELECrRONiC Bus., June 25, 1990, at
63.
Europe has never achieved the organization it hoped for in its electronics
industry. Although it has attempted to become a major player with consortia
such as JESSI (Joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative) and ESPRIT (its
computer counterpart), the making of components and computers has
floundered due to heavy protection. However, the setback in production may
signal a change in policy toward cooperation with the Japanese and the Americans. Barbara N. Berkman, Will Europe'sProtectionistsYield to the Free Marketers?, ELEcTRoNic Bus., July 8, 1991, at 55. But see Ross Denton, The
Commission Communication on European Community Policiesfor Semiconductors, EU. Bus. L. REv., Mar. 1991, at 57, 57-60.
88. Semiconductor Industry Association, Foreign Market Share in Japan as
Defined by the 1991 U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement (unpublished data,
copy on file with the Minnesota Journalof Global Trade) [hereinafter SIA Market Share Data]. One article described market share rising from 8.5% to nearly
13%. New Pact,supra note 5, at 29. The market share data collection and calculation system under the new agreement is more accurate and thus is used here.
The 1986 and 1991 agreements specify foreign market share rather than United
States market share in order to combat most favored nation problems. Because
the U.S. is the world's second largest producer of semiconductors, however, the
figure reflects heavily on U.S. share. See 1986 Agreement, supra note 2, at 1411.
89. Jack Robertson, Confirm CPU Policy Group: For Trade, ELEcTRoNiC
NEws, July 3, 1989, at 1, 7. However, the 20% level did not include the numerous sub-contractors of these firms which consume a large percentage of semiconductors. Telephone Interview with Howard High, Director of Media
Communications, Intel, Inc. (Feb. 18, 1992).
90. Stuart M. Dambrot, Foreign Alliances That Make Sense, ELEcTRoNiC
Bus., Sept. 3, 1990, at 68. The joint ventures include Texas Instrument's joint
development of 16Mb DRAMs with Hitachi; Intel's agreements with NMB
Semiconductor and Matsushita to jointly build a DRAM foundry and EPROM
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pan (EIAJ) squabbled frequently, however. 9 1 The U.S. chip
makers sought a new agreement because the increase in market
92
share did not occur until the final two years of the agreement,
and because U.S. market share fell far short of the 20% bench93
mark even after the increase.

D.
1.

THE

1991 AGREEMENT

Achieving Industry Unity

The SIA changed its strategy the second time around. The
U.S. chip producers still needed to increase sales to Japan, the
world's largest consumer of semiconductors,94 to maintain their
factory, respectively; and an American Telephone & Telegraph and NEC technology partnership in ASICs. Id. See also Clinton Wilder, MotorolaRAM Chip
Output Rekindled with Toshiba Deal, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 23, 1987, at 67
(describing Motorola-Toshiba DRAM licensing agreement).
91. Initially, Japanese complaints focused on lack of sales, engineering and
technical support facilities in Japan and the fact that the U.S. producers failed
to cater to the needs of the Japanese consumer electronics sector which dominated the chip market. Japanese firms complained that U.S. producers were
unreliable because they delayed deliveries to Japan and shipped orders first to
U.S. customers during the 1987 sales boom. Robertson, Japanese Executives
Cool to Goals, supra note 47, at 1.
In 1989, the SIA accused Japan of still not opening its markets. The EIAJ
countered that, for U.S. producers to attain the 20% market share, they would
have to begin manufacturing chips for the consumer electronics sector which
comprised 41% of the $19.1 billion Japanese chip market in 1989. Otherwise,
U.S. firms would have to gain 40% of the computer and equipment sector. This
was unlikely because 40% of that market consisted of demand for memory devices - DRAMs - the product which most U.S. firms deserted just before the
agreement. Robert Ristelhueber, Market Access Rankles SMA, EIAJ, ELECTRONIc NEws, Mar. 13, 1989, at 1, 4.
92. Jack Robertson, Life After the Chip AgreemenL The US.-JapanSemiconductor Agreement Expiration in July 1991, ELEcTRoNIc NEws, Sept. 24,
1990, at 12.
93. General Developments, Japan: US. Semiconductor Producers, Users
Join to Unveil Planfor New US.-Japan Accord, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1533
(Oct. 10, 1990) [hereinafter Producers, Users Join to Unveil Plan]. The final
market share figures were: foreign market share, 14.7%; U.S. market share
roughly 13.7%. SIA Market Share Data, supra note 88, at 2. See also New Pact,
supra note 5, at 29 (foreign share under old calculation 13%, U.S. share, 12%).
While the general electronics market in Japan was down in 1990, semiconductor
manufacturers fared well, projecting hope for future big sales increases. See
Paula Doe, Hard Slogging in the JapaneseMarket, ELECTRONIC Bus., Aug. 5,
1991, at 38, 38-40.
94. SIA, WSTS Forecast, supra note 36 (1992). The WSTS estimate shows
that in 1991, Japan consumed 38.7% of the world's semiconductors, worth $21.5
billion in sales compared with 28.1% and $15.5 billion for the United States.
The SIA projects these amounts to grow by 1994 to $29.2 billion for Japan and
$21.7 billion for the U.S. Id.
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ability to compete throughout the world.95 Every percentage
point gain in the Japanese market was worth about $200 million
in sales, with proportional increases in R&D and capital investment. 96 However, the faults of the 1986 agreement alerted
users; they were ready to oppose any agreement that would
again reduce their competitiveness.97
The SIA needed to find a way to get the government's help
as it tried to extend the market access provisions. At first, the
prospects for government assistance looked bleak. While the
1986 agreement was winding down, United States Trade Representative Carla Hills had labeled the market access provisions,
especially the 20% figure, "managed trade" and vowed to withhold her support from the renewal of a similar agreement. 98 In
addition, the cumbersome FMV system created a rift in the U.S.
electronics industry, discouraging trade negotiators. 99 The solution: the SIA joined forces with its main opponent, the Computer Systems Policy Project (CSPP)1°° to present a unified
95.

New Pact,supra note 5, at 29. Additional Japanese market share brings

with it increased revenues, allowing manufacturers to re-invest to become
larger and more efficient and to compete to design parts for leading-edge Japanese products. Id
96. See A DEAL IS A DEAL, supra note 1, at 10. U.S. semiconductor firms
invest about 11.6% of sales on R&D and another 12% in capital equipment. Another $1 billion in sales (five percent of the $20 billion Japanese chip market)
would not only allow U.S. firms to stay on top of new technology and equipment, but would also allow them to create greater economies of scale resulting
in lower costs and increased sales. I&
97. In the fall of 1988, the AEA and the SIA made an agreement to explore
modification of the FMV calculations. The resolution called for the SIA to request that Commerce drop the F7" calculations and replace them with fasttrack antidumping proceedings (essentially the same as the 1991 agreement). In
exchange, the AEA would support the SIA's quest to gain market access. Jack
Robertson, Move to End FMVs, Use Penalty Tariffs, ELECTRONIC NEWs, Sept.
12, 1988, at 1. However, by December of 1988, the talks had broken down, destroying the potential for industry unity. Jack Robertson, Letting the Chips Fly,
ELETRoNIc NEWS, Dec. 5, 1988, at 1.
The downstream industries continued to argue until a group of heavyweight computer manufacturers decided to counter SIA's political power and
avoid the divisions between the AEA and the CBEMA. See iifra note 101 and
accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Producers,Users Join to Unveil Plan,supra note 93, at 1533.
99. See, e.g., Move to End FMVs, supra note 97, at 8. Without the support of
the U.S. trade negotiators, the SIA could have failed to successfully complete
the 1991 agreement. The rift among sectors was readily apparent in 1989 when
Gordon Moore, Associate Chairman of SIA, tried to unite the electronics industry on semiconductor issues. Mr. Moore received a list of demands from the
uncooperative CBEMA completely redrafting his proposal. One Big Happy
Family, ELEcTRoNIc NEws, July 3, 1989, at 12.

100. SIA-CSPP Joint Memorandum, supra note 27, at 4. CSPP was created
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position to the Bush Administration. 1 1
The compromise approach worked. On October 10, 1990, the
two associations sent a proposal to President Bush which would
later become the basis for the 1991 agreement. 10 2 The new proposal contained two parts. Most importantly, the parties advocated an explicit extension of the 20% market share goal until
the end of 1992.103 The figure appeared obtainable because market access had improved, particularly during the latter period of
the 1986 agreement. 10 4 The parties believed that the target
would maintain pressure on Japanese manufacturers to develop
long-term relationships with foreign suppliers. To achieve the
market share goal, the SIA wanted Japanese computer firms to
"design-in" custom U.S. chips into their products. 0 5 As the SIA
in 1989 as an affiliation of eleven chief executive officers of U.S. computer,
software and services companies. Id. The group formed because of the inability
of the two existing organizations, the AEA and the CBEMA, to present a unified front in Washington. See Confirm CPU Policy Group: For Trade, supra
note 89, at 1; see also One Big Happy Family,supra note 99, at 12. The discouragement of U.S. trade negotiators due to the split in the industry as early as
1988 was another reason CSPP and SIA needed to work together. See Move to
End FMVs, supra note 97, at 1.
The members of CSPP had an additional incentive to cooperate; they hoped
that the government would support a further opening of Japan in their products. The Real Winner, ELECTRONIC Bus., Aug. 5, 1991, at 30. The United
States fulfilled those hopes in January 1992. See Christopher J. Chipello, et al.,
JapanAgrees to Measures to Aid Sales of United States Goods, WALL ST. J., Jan.
9, 1992, at A3-A4 (explaining new Japanese promises to increase purchases of
American products, including computers).
101. Producers,Users Join to Unveil Plan,supra note 93, at 1533; Findinga
Common Ground, ELECTRONIC NEws, Aug. 5, 1991, at 32. CSPP vehemently
opposed the 1986 Agreement because it increased prices of manufacturers' main
components. Id.
102. Finding a Common Ground,supra note 101, at 32.
103. Producers, Users Join to Unveil Plan, supra note 93 at 1533. The parties included this extension because the foreign market share was only 13%
compared to the benchmark of 20%. Id.
The SIA has requested market access arrangements because the Japanese
have complete open access to the U.S. semiconductor user's market. Instead of
closing off that access (as EC countries have done), the SIA will attempt to sell
in Japan's market to make up for lost sales and prior ineffective agreements.
Telephone Interview with Darryl G. Hatano, Director of International Trade &
Government Affairs, SIA (Feb. 18,1992); see also A DEAL IS A DEAL, supra note
1, at 1.
104. But see infra note 125 and accompanying text (progress between 1990
and 1991 slowed considerably compared with increases between 1989 and 1990).
105. At the very least, the SIA wanted to get for U.S. firms a chance to compete for new design-ins. See Jack Robertson & Joyce Barret, 20% JapanMarket
Share "Essential": TI. Chief, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Mar. 25, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter 20% Essential]. A designed-in chip is an integrated circuit custom designed
for a specific system, automobile, etc. This is also known as an Application Spe-
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viewed it, once U.S. manufacturers achieved design-ins, the Japanese would become dependent on the custom U.S. chips and the
U.S. firms would establish a market presence. 1°6 In addition, the
coalition proposed a fast-track antidumping system to replace
the FMV system. 1° 7
2.

Negotiations

The Japanese at first rebuffed efforts by the United States
to negotiate a new agreement. 0 8 Japanese producers viewed the
market access extension as unnecessary because U.S. producers
had already achieved substantial increases in market share. The
Japanese government echoed this sentiment, calling any set
market share figure "inappropriate."' 9 Further, the EIAJ
promised that the Japanese electronics industry would continue
its efforts to open the market to foreign imports."l 0
MITI ultimately agreed to negotiate. The United States and
Japan negotiated for four months, concentrating on four main
issues: the inclusion of the 20% market share figure in the text,
the removal of the remaining 1987 sanctions,"' the wording and
severity of the antidumping provisions and the method for calcucific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). Such a design requires highly proprietary information passed from the product designer to the chip maker. Once the chip
producer has designed the chip, the product manufacturer relies exclusively on
that producer. See Flamm, supra note 80, at 227-29. U.S. chipmakers hope such
cooperation will induce long-term reliance on U.S. firms, thus increasing market share and sustaining part of the industry. See Computer Systems Policy
Project, Perspectives on Market Access and Antidumping Law Reform, 5-6
(1990) (unpublished paper on file with The MinnesotaJournalof Global Trade).
In sum, increasing Japanese market share will allow the U.S. semiconductor
industry to remain competitive in the world market.
106. 20% Essential,supra note 105, at 1. The Japanese merchant market is
not a sustainable market for U.S. producers. Id. at 7. Vertically integrated Japanese firms such as those in computers, automobiles and telecommunications
make their own chips and do not need the U.S. chips on a continual basis. Unfortunately, U.S. makers do not produce the right kind of chips for the consumer electronics industry, the only sector that requires large quantities of
fungible chips. See, e.g., A.I. Nakajima, Heat Turned Upfor More Chip Imports,
THE NIKKEi WEEKLY, Apr. 18, 1992, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,

Papers File.
107. See Japan: Japan, U.S. Open Semiconductor Talks: Market Share in
Japan Seen as Issue, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 275, 276 (1991) [hereinafter Japan, U.S. Open Talks]; Japan: U.S. Semiconductor Industry Wants 25 Percent
Market Share in Japan Within Next Five Years, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 352,
353 (1991) [hereinafter US. Industry Wants 25 Percent].
108. See Producers,Users Join to Unveil Plan, supra note 93, at 1533.
109. See Japan, U.S. Open Talks, supra note 107, at 276.
110. Id.
111. PactNegotiations Stick, supra note 39, at 618.
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lating market share. 112 After a considerable struggle, the parties
settled the first two issues by trade-off: the Japanese government would support a market access goal in the text, and in return the United States would drop the $165 million in sanctions
remaining from 1987.113 They agreed that the market access
goal was not a guaranteed ceiling or floor, but only a measure of
how successful U.S. firms were in gaining additional market
4
share in Japan."
The countries resolved the third issue, the new antidumping
provision, by replacing the then-current FMV floor price system
with a fast-track dumping procedure." 5 Japanese manufacturers would continue to maintain detailed cost records which they
would have to submit within fourteen days of the filing of a
dumping complaint." 6 This fast-track approach would enable
procedures to begin immediately after the United States suspected dumping.
The 1991 agreement is much more flexible than the 1986
agreement. It allows the parties after three years to set additional quantitative goals, develop looser agreements, or jointly
terminate the agreement altogether." 7 The SIA-CSPP coalition
believed U.S. chipmakers could accomplish the 20% market
share goal within the eighteen-month extension." 8
Calculation of market share continued to be a problem for
both countries. The 1986 pact specified no formula, so each
party used formulas which supported its position. The United
States interpreted foreign market share to include U.S.-produced chips sold to Japanese manufacturers, while Japan used
112. Japan: Semiconductor Talks to Continue as Some Technical Issues Remain to be Resolved, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 739 (1991).
113. Japan: U.S. and Japan Sign SemiconductorPact Targeting 20 Percent
Share, Design-Ins, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. 845 (1991) [hereinafter US. and Japan
Sign Pact].
114. 1991 Agreement, supra note 3, at II(10).
115. The 1991 provisions on dumping are much more relaxed than those in
the 1986 agreement. This is primarily due to the harm done to the United
States industry under the first agreement and the fact that dumping had virtually disappeared since 1987. See generally OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE U.S.-JAPAN SEMICONDUCTOR ARRANGEMENT (June 4, 1991), at 3.

116. Id. See also U.S. and Japan Sign Pact, supra note 113, at 845.
117. 1991 Agreement, supra note 3, at IV (12). The agreement states that
the U.S. industry "expects that the foreign market share will grow to more than
20 percent of the Japanese market by the end of 1992." Id.at 11 (10). However,
the agreement continues at least until 1993. Id.at IV (12).
118. See Japan: JapaneseElectronicsIndustry Agrees to Closer Cooperation
With US. Chip Makers, 8 Int'l Trade Rep (BNA) 900, 901 (1991).
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different calculations and included different types of sales. 119
As a result, Japanese calculations showed a larger U.S. share of
Japan's market than U.S. calculations. 12°
Under the new agreement, both countries will still calculate
their own market shares, but they must now agree on the calculations each will use. The United States will calculate the
amount of foreign sales in Japan (the numerator of the percentage) using the data collection program (DCP)12 ' and MITI will
calculate the total size of the Japanese semiconductor market
(the denominator of the percentage).Y2 The central difference
between these two methods is that MITI will include two additional types of sales: captive sales - intercompany sales of chips
made in Japan by U.S. manufacturers for their own use - and
foreign branded product sales - chips made by Japanese companies under a U.S. manufacturer's name. 2 3 The first market
share calculation under the new agreement came out in December 1991. The figure indicated that the foreign market share in
the third quarter of 1991 was only 14.3% compared with 14.7% in
the second quarter of 1991.12A The growth rate has flattened
rapidly, perhaps due in part to the state of the Japanese economy.125 Although little comment has been made by either coun119. See Valerie Rice, Why the Numbers Don'tAlways Add Up, ELECrRONIC
Bus., Aug. 5, 1991, at 31 [hereinafter Numbers] (the United States used the
World Semiconductor Trade Statistics derived from SIA data).
120. For example, the U.S. readings (before the new calculation system) put
total foreign market share at about 13%. Japan's computed figure is closer to
16%. Id.
121. The Data Collection Program is a system devised by the two governments to improve the accuracy of the data used in market share calculations.
Under the 1986 agreement, the countries estimated the figures which they input
into their formulas. The Data Collection Program provides for a large number
of U.S. and other non-Japanese foreign semiconductor manufacturers to report
their sales in the Japanese market directly to the U.S. government. The United
States and Japan will then jointly verify the data to ensure accuracy. 1991
Agreement, Annex A: Statistical System, supra note 3, at 9-13.
122. Numbers, supra note 119, at 31.
123. U.S. and JapanSign Pact, supra note 113, at 845.
124. Foreign Chip Makers Held 14.3% of the Market in Japan Last Quarter,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1991, at B5 (Eastern edition). The SIA restated the market share numbers reported under the 1986 agreement according to the 1991
agreement formula. SIA Market Share Data, supra note 88, at 2. During 1989
foreign market share increased from 11.7% to 13.5%. Foreign share began at
13.5% in early 1990, reached a high of 15.5% and dropped to 14.0% by the end of
1990. Id
125. Statistics for the fourth quarter of 1991 indicated little improvement,
increasing only to 14.4%. The Japanese government responded by blaming the
poor economy. USTR Carla Hills still implored the Japanese government and
industry to boost their efforts to buy foreign semiconductors. See Foreign-Chip
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try on this trend, it appears. unlikely that foreign firms will
achieve a 20% market share by December 1992.
II.

NEW DIRECTIONS: THE REALITIES OF THE 1991
AGREEMENT

The 1991 agreement marks a noticeable weakening of U.S.
leverage in high technology trade. While the agreement again
seeks to increase market access opportunities and, to a lesser extent, to prevent dumping, the dependence of the U.S. electronics
industry on Japan and the use of sanctions to enforce the 1986
agreement frustrates the ability of the United States to enforce
the new agreement. To the extent these factors prevail, the success or failure of the agreement appears to fall squarely on the
shoulders of the U.S. semiconductor industry. Because both
countries have learned from their experience with the provisions and operation of the 1986 agreement, the prospects for success of the 1991 agreement should be better. Likewise, the
lessons learned will probably change the prospect of U.S. enforcement action.
A.

ANTIDUMPING:

LESSONS LEARNED

The lessons of the first five years manifested themselves in
the antidumping provisions of the current agreement. The antidumping provisions of the 1986 agreement consisted of blunt
and cumbersome regulations which ignored several central
truths of the industries involved. Specifically, the agreement ignored the semiconductor industry's pricing structure, the competitiveness of the U.S. industry in some products and the user
industries' dependence on Japanese products, especially
DRAMs. 126 In its haste to save the producers, the government
apparently did not consult the user industries 127 and further
fragmented the electronics industry instead of promoting a conLag in Japan,N.Y. TDMES, Mar. 31, 1992, at D5. For an indication of the slowdown in the electronics sector of the economy, see Jacob M. Schlesinger, Profits
Decline at High-Tech Firms in Japan,WALL ST. J., May 27, 1992, at All (Midwest edition) (citing profit declines of 41% to 65%) [hereinafter Profits Decline].
126. It appears that Commerce should have set the FMV prices in accordance with "forward pricing" to more closely approximate market prices. Jack
Robertson, Urge Relaxed Dumping Laws, ELECTRONIC NEWS, May 21, 1990, at 1
(statement of John Young, President of Hewlett-Packard).
127. But see Moad, supra note 46, at 17. (statement by then-SIA vice president Shiela Sandow that the SIA did inform the user groups who assumed nothing was going to happen and so did not react to the pre-arrangement
negotiations).
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sensus. The resulting high prices of DRAMs hurt both consumers and producers. 12
The SIA and CSPP designed the new antidumping provisions to give U.S. semiconductor producers adequate protection
from dumping while allowing the U.S. electronics industry to
buy chips at global market prices.129 The agreement still protects U.S. semiconductor manufacturers because Japanese firms
must collect production and sales data on standard representative products on a quarterly basis,'- and the countries will update the list of products as needed. 13 1 Thus, the new
antidumping provisions should operate effectively despite reduced enforcement measures.
B.

DEVELOPMENTS -

RENEWED DUMPING CONCERNS

Notwithstanding the fanfare surrounding the new antidumping provisions, U.S. producers remain wary of dumping.
The level of protection from dumping varies greatly by product,
with a large contrast between DRAMs and EPROMS. Although
the 1991 agreement covers broad product types (e.g., DRAMs,
EPROMs), data is collected only for certain representative subgroups, leaving some products unprotected if dumping occurs.-3 2
The agreement also fails to protect U.S. producers if Japanese
128. In the future, if the situation arises, the government must first understand the industry to avoid creating unrealistic pricing structures and protecting non-existent products. See, e.g., Flamm, supra note 12, at 27-28.
129. During the 1986 agreement, U.S. computer manufacturers paid $22 per
DRAM while their Japanese competitors paid $16. A DEAL Is A DEAL, supra
note 1, at 20.
130. The Revised Suspension Agreement requires the major Japanese manufacturers (NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba, Sanyo, and
Sharp) to maintain price and cost data of chips exported to the United States,
other foreign countries (as a whole), and the five largest countries next to the
United States on a country-by-country basis. In addition, the Japanese companies must maintain cost and price data for sales in Japan. Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory Semiconductors From Japan, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,523
(Dep't Commerce 1991) (terminating administrative review and revision of suspension agreement).
The Japanese companies complained that the cost of keeping the records
required under the new agreement would increase DRAM prices. Richard McCausland, Fear Trade Accord's Costs Could Boost DRAM Prices, ELECTRONIC
NEws, July 22, 1991, at 1.
131. 1991 Agreement, supra note 3, at III:2(a). Whether the agreement covers a given product can be very important. U.S. firms have little antidumping
protection for chips that are not yet protected under the cost collection system.
If the United States suspected dumping of a chip not under the agreement, an
investigation would still take six to twelve months. Robert Ristelhueber, Commerce Lists Flash as EPROM, ELECTRONIC NEws, Dec. 9, 1991, at 1.
132. See id.
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companies dump a new product before the governments have
added it to the list of monitored products. 133 If this happens, any
dumping investigation could still take from six to twelve months
to collect the necessary data. l 34 The delay could put U.S. producers in a situation similar to that in 1985-86 when Japanese manufacturers gained substantial market share at the expense of
their U.S. counterparts. 13 SIA member firms have already
proved their vigilance, however, and would undoubtedly complain at the first hint of dumping. 1 w
1.

EPROMs

Dumping is less of a concern in the EPROM sector than it is
in the case of the DRAM sector, in part because the U.S. industry has maintained market share and may have an edge in some
EPROM products. More importantly, a modified suspension
agreement from the 1986 antidumping case remains in place
with respect to EPROMs. 137 The dumping duties Commerce assessed in that case pose an immediate threat to major Japanese
companies. If U.S. producers prove Japanese dumping of any
type of EPROM, under the revised suspension agreement Commerce could immediately impose the substantial duties determined in 1986.138 Until recently, however, U.S. firms did not
know whether Commerce would include new but similar products under the suspension agreement. 139
The U.S. industry foresees intense competition in a new
133.

A product joins the watch list if: (1) it is a standard and general use

semiconductor, or (2) there is evidence of a threat of sales at less than normal
value, and either government requests its inclusion. 1991 Agreement, supra
note 3, at III:2(a)(i-ii). In addition, the agreement states that new products will
be added to the list when their export from Japan increases. Commerce Lists
Flash as EPROM, supra note 131, at 1.
134. Commerce Lists Flash as EPROM, supra note 131, at 1. (statement of
Intel spokesman).
135. See also T.J. Rodgers, An Industry That Doesn't Need Saving From Japan, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1992, at A7. According to Dataquest, the U.S. share of
semiconductor sales slipped from 54% in 1982 to 34% in 1990 while Japan's
share increased from 34% to 49%. Id.
136. See, e.g., Stephen K. Yoder, US. Microchip Makers Suspect Japan of
Dumping, but Some See Lack of Proof,WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1992, at Cll (Midwest edition) (discussing the U.S. industry's allegations of dumping before its
annual meeting).
137. See supra notes 33, 129-31 and accompanying text.
138. Commerce Lists Flash as EPROM,supra note 131, at 1 (U.S. producers
would first have to complain about dumping, but Commerce retains the option
to apply the previously set duties). See supra note 33 (dumping duties ranged
from 60% to 188%).
139. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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EPROM technology called "Flash EPROM," which is likely to
revolutionize data storage. Flash chips are similar to regular
EPROMs, but are easier to erase and re-program, making them
useful for data storage. 14°
The U.S. industry is concerned that Japanese manufacturers will overinvest in flash manufacturing capacity and dump
the chips once a viable market exists for them,141 forcing the
smaller U.S. producers out of the market. I 4 In April, 1992, the
International Trade Administration (ITA) issued a final scope
ruling that flash chips fit the definition of EPROMs under the
suspension agreement. 143 Thus, if the United States suspects
Japanese companies of dumping EPROMs, including Flash
Memories, Commerce could institute the prior dumping duties
almost immediately.'" In sum, the combination of the suspen140. Because erasing the data is difficult in most current EPROMs, they are
used only for repetitive tasks such as regulating automobile engines. Flash
chips use electrical charges to erase the stored data instead of expensive ultraviolet light, making them much easier to use. Stephen K. Yoder, FutureAppears
Brightfor 'Flsh'Chips, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1992, at B1.
It is believed that flash chips will be able to replace hard disks in computers
by 1995, making the sector extremely important. The technology will be especially useful in portable computers, where size and battery life are circumscribed by the weighty and energy-draining hard disk. Id at B1. Although the
flash market is currently in its infant stages, it is expected to reach $1.45 billion
by 1995. Id
141. Total sales in 1992 are projected to reach $200 million. Currently, Intel
leads all manufacturers with 85% of the market; Toshiba, the inventor of the
technology, holds only 3%. Id
142. This is exactly what happened with DRAMs in 1985-86. See supra
notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
143. The ITA made the preliminary ruling in December 1991. Erasable
Programmable Read Only Memories from Japan, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,743 (Dep't
Commerce 1991) (prelim. scope ruling). Four Japanese companies subsequently
filed comments opposing the ruling, but the ITA reaffirmed its preliminary determination. Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories from Japan, 57 Fed.
Reg. 11,593 (Dep't Commerce 1992) (Int'l Trade Admin., final scope ruling). After the ITA notified the ITC of its decision to include a later developed product
under the revised suspension agreement, the ITC acquiesced.
After our analysis of the comments received, the Department of
Commerce reaffirms its preliminary scope ruling that certain Flash
Memories are within the scope of the suspended investigation and suspension agreement.
On January 28, 1992, the ITC responded to our notification of intent to include a later-developed product within the scope of the suspended investigation and advised the Department that consultations
were not necessary in this case.
Id. at 11,594.
144. Commerce Lists Flashas EPROM,supra note 131, at 1. This is a significant difference; if the ITA had classified flash chips as a separate product, the
parties would have had to first fall under the agreement. See supra note 131
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sion agreement and the scope ruling will substantially deter Japanese dumping of EPROMs in the United States.
2.

DRAMs

The conditions are much different in the DRAM sector. After the near-death of the U.S. DRAM industry in 1986, it appeared that once the United States dropped the FMV system,
Japanese dumping of DRAMs would not matter to the U.S. chip
industry. The surge in demand for DRAMs in the late 1980s,
however, prompted two additional U.S. manufacturers to either
fortify or re-enter DRAM production. i 45 Unlike the EPROM
sector, no suspension agreement remains to deter Japanese
firms from dumping DRAMs. Instead, U.S. firms must rely on
the antidumping provisions in the agreement. Because the U.S.
firms make up such a small portion of the market, renewed
dumping by the Japanese could destroy their business even
before a regular antidumping investigation could take place.
The problem is that current market conditions mirror those
which prevailed in 1985-86. The general user market is sluggish
and the main Japanese producers have invested heavily in large
manufacturing facilities, anticipating considerable demand for
the 4Mb DRAM chip. That chip has not yet sold well. 146 For the
first time, three generations of DRAMs (1Mb, 4Mb and 16Mb)
are simultaneously competing against each other in the marketplace. 147 Multiple generations and increased competition from
Korean producers reduces the amount of return on the new
chips, further diminishing profits.148 Japanese producers will
(they would have had to be either general use semiconductors or dumped). If
flash chips did not fall with the scope of the agreement, any dumping investiga-

tions would take six to twelve months to gather the data. See supra note 130.

145. See U.S. Microchip Makers Suspect Japan ofDumping, supra note 136,
at CI. Of the U.S. DRAM producers remaining in April, 1992 (Micron Technology, IBM, Motorola, and Texas Instruments), id., the last two produce
through licensing arrangements with Japanese companies. See Dambrot, supra

note 90, at 68; Wilder, supra note 90, at 67-68. For a description of the erosion of

the DRAM industry, see text accompanying notes 51-54.
146. Falling Off the Learning Curve, supra note 53, at 66. The Japanese
spent $6.7 billion on production facilities for the 4Mb chip but sales have been
fiat and prices down, largely because much existing software does not yet require that much memory.
147. I; Andrew Pollack, Executives Say Japan May Be Dumping Chips,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992, at C2 (National edition).
148. U.S. Microchip Makers Suspect Japan of Dumping, supra note 136, at
Cll (Korean producers also have excess capacity and are taking market share
away from Japanese firms). See ProfitsDecline, supra note 125, at All (report-
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likely try to recoup their massive investment, 149 making the conditions ripe for dumping. 15°
If the U.S. producers make a timely showing that dumping
is occurring, 151 the speed with which Commerce compiles and
assembles the data will likely determine the success of the antidumping provisions. The investigation process would prevent
significant loss of market share by U.S. firms if it works as it is
152
designed.
In the future, antidumping statutes must provide for quick
investigations after sufficient allegations. U.S. companies must
continually monitor the competition and be ready to file a petition if dumping occurs. The investigative process should be
shortened as much as practicable to prevent further loss of domestic producer market share. Furthermore, the remedies must
strike with precision to avoid unreasonable injury to the user
industries which receive some benefits from dumping.lsa The
difficulty of imposing meaningful antidumping duties will increase as interdependence grows between the two countries.
This may be the last chance U.S. producers have to establish
themselves competitively before the United States is unable to
enforce its rights without severely crippling itself.
ing that Japanese electronics companies plan to cut capital spending in their
semiconductor divisions between 20% and 50%).
149. Because prices for the 1Mb DRAM are low as well, the sales prices may
be too low for producers to recapture their initial investment on the 4Mb production lines. Falling Off the Learning Curve, supra note 53, at 64.
150. I& Several firms are currently striving for perfection of the next
DRAM generation, the 64Mb, expected by 1995. This pressure will also drive
the price down. Hooper, supra note 9, at B4.
151. The U.S. manufacturers must show tangible evidence of dumping
before Commerce could start any action. If the tangible evidence is not available until the U.S. manufacturers have lost excessive revenues, any action on
the part of Commerce could be too late.
152. Preserving the remaining DRAM producers could also facilitate production and development of more sophisticated chips because the high-volume
DRAM production helps develop efficient manufacturing processes applicable
to the other chips. See ikfra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
153. Current antidumping protocol requires an intricate petition alleging
sales at less than fair value. When the International Trade Administration
makes a preliminary determination of sales at less than fair value, preliminary
duties are collected. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(1). Collecting the data necessary to
initiate a petition, often a difficult task, creates a time lag which can lead to
further erosion of the complaining industry. Currently, the U.S. semiconductor
industry watches for signs of dumping but collecting data to file a petition
would still take up to a year. See Commerce Lists Flash as Eprom, supra note
131, at 1.
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MARKET AccESS: A CHIP ON THE U.S. INDUSTRY'S

SHOULDER

Despite the antidumping concerns, the focus of the new
agreement is to increase foreign market share in Japan. Under
the 1986 pact, market access did not improve significantly until
after the United States imposed sanctions.' 54 Now the threat of
sanctions is considerably weaker than in 1986 and only one
means of providing security remains: U.S. semiconductor manufacturers must use the 1991 agreement to break through the barriers which Japanese business practices create, and then
generate genuine demand for their products.
Of course, determinations as to the success or failure of the
market access provisions will continue to be complicated by the
fact that the United States and Japan still disagree on how to
compute market share. Government and industry hail the new
foreign market share calculations because the new agreement
specifies a data collection process and defines the formulas each
country will use to calculate the foreign market share in Japan.'-5 5 The reality remains that Japan uses a different formula
than the United States and that the Japanese figure will always
exceed the U.S. figure. 15 6 Even though MITI knows that the
United States will regard the U.S. calculation as the real measure of market access, 157 it will continue to promote its own figure as a true measure of foreign market access. 156
1.

Summary

-

Gains Made to Date

The SIA fought hard for the market access provisions in
both the 1986 and 1991 agreements. By the late 1980s Japanese
manufacturers had captured a significant percentage of the
world semiconductor market from U.S. producers. 159 Instead of
154.

Most of the improvement really occurred in the last two years. See

supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. U.S. market share as
calculated by the Japanese went from 19% before the 1991 arrangement to 16%
immediately after it went into effect.

156. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
157.

U.S. and JapanSign Pact,supra note 113, at 845 (statement of S. Linn

Williams, Deputy USTR and head negotiator).
158. See, e.g., Foreign Chip Makers Held 14.3% Last Quarter,supra note 124,
at B5. "Sinichi Itoh, chairman of the User's Committee of Foreign Semiconduc-

tors of the Electronic Industries Association of Japan, said, however, that under
the terms of a second formula for calculating market share access, penetration
increased to 16.2 percent." SA. Sanctions Only as Last Resort in JapanMarket

Access Dispute, ELECTRONIC NEws, Mar. 23, 1992, at 16.
159. See, e.g.,

BACKGROUND INFORMATION,

supra note 8, at 4-5 (noting that
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encouraging the imposition of barriers to the U.S. market to
combat this loss of market share, the SIA sought greater access
to the Japanese market.'l6'

The SIA believed the 20% market

share goal would allow U.S. firms to break into most sectors of
the Japanese market.16 1 The goal would implicitly require Japanese users to design-in U.S.-made chips resulting in long-term
contracts and, eventually, lasting relationships with U.S.
162
producers.
The 1986 agreement did give U.S. semiconductor manufacturers confidence to make the investments essential to improving their competitive position in Japan.163 U.S. companies built
60 sales, development and testing centers in Japan,'6 set up
joint ventures with Japanese firms, 16s and interacted with Japanese users associations in their efforts to break into the Japanese market.166 These activities helped U.S. firms increase the
foreign market share from 8.0% in September 1986 to 14.7% in
July 1991.167

2.

The Key: Real Market Demand

The 1991 agreement attempts to raise the U.S. share of the
Japanese market closer to the U.S. share of the other world
between 1981 and 1988 U.S. world semiconductor share plunged from 57% to
37.4% while Japan's share increased from 33% to 51.2%).
160. Telephone Interview with Darryl Hatano, supra note 103.
161. This goal would allow U.S. producers to enter otherwise impenetrable
markets such as consumer electronics. "'his breadth of market penetration is
necessary if the U.S. and other foreign industries are ever to obtain the benefits
of a truly open market." A DEAL IS A DEAL, supra note 1, at 8.
162. Without such long-term relationships, the U.S. producers are merely
spot-market suppliers, which over the long run does not create sustainable demand. 20%Essential, supra note 105, at 7.
The reader should note that the prediction of reaching the market share
goal through design-ins is predicated on the U.S. manufacturers presenting a
product that the Japanese users need.
163. In the eyes of the SIA, the market access language in the 1991 agreement is simply an extension of what U.S. firms learned during the 1986 agreement. Telephone Interview with Darryl Hatano, supra note 103.
164. A DEAL IS A DEAL, supra note 1, at 4; Telephone Interview with Darryl
Hatano, supra note 103.
165. MITI has included or forced inclusion of several U.S. firms in its manufacturing of HDTV. See MatsushitaElectric,NEC, Mitsubishi ElectricAgree to
Jointly Develop HDTV-Use ICs, Comline Daily News Telecommunications,
Nov. 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, CMPCOM Library, ALLCMP File.
166. A DEAL IS A DEAL, supra note 1, at 4. These organizations include the
Japan Automotive Parts Industries Association (JAPIA), the Distributors Association of Foreign Semiconductors (DAFS), and the EIAJ's Users' Committee
of Foreign Semiconductors (EIAJ-UCOM). Id at 1-4.
167. SIA, WSTS Forecast, supra note 37, at 2.
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markets.'l 8 There are several possible reasons for this lack of
sales, including the perceived inferiority of U.S. products, 169 the
inability of U.S. companies to meet demand in upturns, 170 the
strength of the keiretsu in setting economic policy, and general
anti-foreign sentiment.' 7 ' The U.S. industry has remained technologically competitive with Japan, however, 172 and holds a slim
173
lead in some products.
Before U.S. producers can compete on the merits of their
products, they must break through the barriers created by Japanese business practices, especially the keiretsu structure. 174 U.S.
firms have made some progress. At the beginning of the 1986
agreement, the semiconductor supplier divisions of Japanese
conglomerates were blocking U.S. semiconductor firms from
selling directly to the user divisions, effectively cutting off U.S.
access to major buyers of memory products. By the end of the
1986 agreement, however, most of the major Japanese electronics companies were purchasing more than 20% of their semiconductors from foreign firms. 175 Nevertheless, overall foreign
market share in Japan remained at just 14.4%.176 With significant effort, the 1986 agreement succeeded in loosening barriers
to the Japanese market. It will take additional effort to break
168. Outside of Japan, the U.S. has a much greater market share even when

competing against the Japanese. U.S. Chip Makers Rail Against Japanese,

supra note 36, at B1.
169. Boyd Harnell, Congress Backs SLA on Japan Market Share, ELECTRONIC NEws, June 12, 1989, at 4.
170. Howell, supra note 17, at 16-8. The Japanese have generally believed
that American suppliers are unable to deliver in cyclical upswings because they
invest too little during recessions. See also Falling Off the Learning Curve,

supra note 53, at 64.
171.

Alan S. Gutterman, Japanand Korea" Contrasts and Comparisons in

Regulatory Policies of Cooperative Growth Economies, 8 INT'L TAx & Bus.
LAw. 267, 273, 291-93 (contending that once the individual industries grew pow-

erful, they wielded some influence over the government).
172. Rodgers, supra note 135, at A7. Rodgers believes that the Japanese are
better at manufacturing-, the U.S. is better at design and innovation. According
to Rodgers, the United States is catching up faster in manufacturing process
than Japan is improving its innovation. Id.

173. According to Darryl Hatano, SIA President for Governmental Affairs,
the U.S. industry still has a marginal lead in the development and manufacture
of some EPROMs, ASICs, and microprocessors. Telephone Interview with Darryl Hatano, supra note 103.
174. See generally Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example of Bilateral Trade Negotiation, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 436
(1991).

175. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; A DEAL IS A DEAL, supra

note 1, at 8.
176. Foreign-ChipLag in Japan, supra note 125, at D5.
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through the remaining barriers to open markets so that true
competition can occur.
Assuming that U.S. products break through the structural
barriers, U.S. producers must show that they possess the latest
technology and the sophisticated designs needed by Japanese
users, and that they can meet Japanese quality and quantity requirements. Currently, the United States may hold a slight
technological advantage in application-specific chips and
microprocessors, the brains of computers. 177 Innovative U.S.
firms which work to adapt U.S. technology to Japanese needs
178
will have a greater chance of selling in Japan.
In many sectors, U.S. producers are just beginning to understand how to address the users' concerns. 179 The SIA advocated
extending the 20% market share benchmark for an additional
eighteen months to ensure that U.S. firms penetrate many sectors of the market, and to give additional time to joint projects
which started in the last years of the 1986 pact. i s ° For example,
firms have had trouble selling to the sub-contractors for the
larger electronics firms. The SIA and EIAJ are trying to develop Market Access Plans (MAPs) for each user, in which the
user sets goals for using foreign chips.' 8 ' In the future, U.S.
manufacturers may reach these sub-contractor companies by
persuading the large electronics companies to set content requirements for their sub-contracted parts, the ultimate affirmative action plan. 8 2

U.S. firms must broach Japan's consumer electronics mar177. Howard High said that the U.S. lead is flat, but that several new products will provide impetus to U.S. technical advantage. Telephone Interview
with Howard High, supra note 89. Darryl Hatano from the SIA stated that the
U.S. has the lead in some ASICS and microprocessors. Telephone Interview
with Darryl Hatano, supra note 103.
178. TRADING PLACES, supra note 1, at 30-32; accord Rodgers, supra note
135, at A7. But see Nakajima, supra note 106, at 3 (statement of Kunihisa Ono
of the EIAJ) (contending the real demand is in memory chips which U.S. producers no longer make).
179. Individual producers and Japanese users have met face to face in many
joint user/producer seminars. In addition, special task forces in each sector currently work to increase U.S. exposure. A DEAL IS A DEAL, supra note 1, at 4.
180. See id. at 3 (many industry initiatives did not start until 1989 or 1990).
181. Id. at 4. As of April 1992, eighty-three major chip users had provided
MITI with market access plans which explain in detail what chips the company
needs, procurement patterns and other information. Heat Turned Up for More
Chip Imports, supra note 106, at 3.
182. Telephone interview with Howard High, supra note 89. Mr. High commented that over 50% of Japan's chip consumption occurs outside of the large
companies, much of it through sub-contracting.
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ket, the largest sector of the semiconductor industry, in order to
come close to achieving the agreement's market share goals.
This is no small endeavor because U.S. producers have not had a
domestic consumer electronics industry to supply.183 Instead
they have concentrated on developing chips for the computer
and telecommunications markets.1l 4 The result is that, with
Japanese assistance under both agreements, U.S. firms have had
to regain the technology they lost when the U.S. domestic consumer electronics industry died.ls
Perhaps a greater barrier for U.S. producers is that many no
longer design or produce DRAMs. DRAMs provide two competitive advantages for those who manufacture them: first, they act
as technology drivers,' 86 providing technical and manufacturing
knowledge necessary to the design and production of more sophisticated chips; second, user companies need DRAMs in large
quantities to put into their electronic devices.18 7 Combining the
design advantages and the high demand element, DRAMs are
needed for a manufacturer to compete in the Japanese market
because of the large quantity of consumer products manufactured there. Japanese firms have an advantage because they
lead the world in design and manufacture of DRAMs.l ss
As new technology develops, however, a debate is growing
over whether DRAMs are the exclusive technology driver, or
whether other, more sophisticated chips may provide the same
impetus for wide-spread technological advances. To the extent
183. Because there is no domestic industry for consumer electronics, the
U.S. industry has focused on other industries, limiting its competitiveness in
consumer electronics. See Market Access Rankles SIA, EIAJ, supra note 91, at 4.
184. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
185. See, e.g., Market Access Rankles SLA, EIAJ, supra note 91, at 4 (arguing
that the United States is not competitive in the products Japanese consumer
electronics users need).
186. The term "technology driver" simply means that by designing, manufacturing and mass-producing a given type of chip (currently DRAMs), the
manufacturer learns how to avoid problems with more intricate designs and
also the best way to mass produce a semiconductor chip, so as to maximize the
number of good chips (yield). Thus, manufacturers producing DRAMs have a

distinct advantage over competitors using lower volume memory products as
technology drivers. Jack Robertson, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Jan. 13. 1986, at 8. This
view continues to be widely held. Jack Robertson, Confirm Major IBM Role in
Creation of US. Memories, ELECTRONIC NEWS, June 26, 1989, at I (statement of

Dr. Robert Noyce, CEO of Sematech).
187. See Heat Turned Up for More Chip Imports, supra note 106, at 3.
188. As world competition intensifies, this leadership role may abate. See
supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text (discussing the IBM-Siemens joint
venture for the 64Mb DRAM and general state of competition in the international market).
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that design and production of higher level chips provide a similar advantage, the United States will remain a center for new,
innovative designs.' 8 9 In addition, the potential for Flash Memories to replace DRAMs would mean that U.S. producers have
another chance to prove their competitiveness. 19 °
After convincing the Japanese of their technological competence, U.S. firms must prove they can meet Japanese demands
for consistent, on-time delivery of products which meet user
quality standards. U.S. firms have built a reputation as unreliable suppliers of marginal quality chips. The new agreement explicitly recognizes this stigma and calls for U.S. firms to meet
the quality requirements of their Japanese customers while
maintaining a steady supply of the correct chips. 191
Advances in chip technology will require greater capital investment to design new generations of chips and build the manufacturing facilities in which to produce them. Extremely high
design and manufacture costs raise the stakes, bringing with
them a high risk of failure if the design or manufacture is flawed
or falls behind schedule, allowing competitors' products to win
contracts. 192 To distribute the risk and cost, firms throughout
the world join with other manufacturers to develop and/or produce products. 193 One example of such cooperation is the IBMSiemens project to design and manufacture 64Mb DRAMs. 194
A better example is the joint effort between Intel, the largest U.S. semiconductor manufacturer, and Sharp, the Japanese
consumer electronics maker, to design and manufacture Flash
189. "[Viewed as a country or as a group of companies, the U.S. is positioned
where it should be. It dominates the high-value, high-margin, innovationdriven part of the semiconductor business." Rodgers, supra note 135, at A7.
190. Being successful at this technology will require the capital and the patience to capture market share. It will also probably involve partnerships with
other larger manufacturers to maintain capital investment levels required for
large scale production. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
191. 1991 Agreement, Joint Announcement on Market Access Activities,
supra note 3, at 2(1)(b-e).
192. See Dambrot, supra note 90, at 69.
193. This is especially true for the smaller American producers which join
up with their financially stronger Japanese counterparts. U.S. firms cannot afford the huge capital outlays required to produce large volume commodity or
other chips. Dambrot, supra note 90, at 68 (the cost of building a fabrication
plant is well over $250 million). This is largely because of the high cost of capital and the short-term financial outlook in the U.S. contrasted with cheaper
capital and a long-term outlook in Japan. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
194. IBM gets Siemens chipmaking expertise and non-Japanese rival technology, Siemens gets to defray its cost, and both companies avoid the huge risks
of self-developing the technology. See Hooper, supra note 9, at B4.
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Memories. 19 5 In 1992, Intel held 85% of the tiny world market
It joined forces with Sharp to defray the
for these devices.'
cost of developing future generations of Flash, acquire the capital and the economies of scale necessary to remain competitive
when the market expands, and enter the hard-to-penetrate consumer electronics field.197 In return, Sharp will receive the
technology and the rights to produce a product which it will use
extensively in its consumer electronics business.198
3.

Forcing Market Share

If U.S. firms do not succeed in increasing their market share
within the first eighteen months of the 1991 agreement, the SIA
may seek government intervention. Executives of SIA member
companies stressed at the signing of the 1991 agreement that
they expected their market share to reach the 20% goal by
1992.199 If this goal is not met, the SIA may lobby the U.S. government to levy sanctions again.2°° However, sanctions may not
have the same effect on Japan as they did in 1987.
195. For a definition of flash and its future sales potential, see supra notes
140-41 and accompanying text.
196. FutureAppears Brightfor Flash Chips, supra note 140, at B1.
197. Intel is known for its computer chips but has very little experience in
consumer electronics. The alliance should give them a chance to produce chips
for the segment. Id.
198. This alliance makes good business sense. Without the alliance, Intel
has little hope of even holding onto a small share of the world market, and
Sharp needs the chips. However, the alliance also underscores how, even when
U.S. firms are technologically advanced, they still must rely on Japan for capital. See id This fosters trade because it ultimately produces closer relationships between the two countries' industries, but it also gives the Japanese
industry great power over its American counterpart.
199. "Japan's public recognition that the foreign market share of the Japanese semiconductor market will increase to a minimum of 20 percent by the end
of 1992 is a historic milestone." U.S. and JapanSign Pact,supra note 113, at 845
(statement of Wilfred Corrigan, chairman, SIA). "We're supposed to have 20%
by year's end or dire things will happen." US. Chip Makers Rail Against Japanese, supra note 36, at B1 (statement of Mr. Corrigan).
This is a sensitive point. Development of good relationships without sales
does the U.S. manufacturers little good. Whether U.S. manufacturers will put
forth full effort to bring the required products to the Japanese market, however, remains to be seen.
200. In mid-March 1992, the SIA and its member firms complained loudly in
the press about lack of improvement in market access and threatened to push
for sanctions. See, e.g., US. Chip Makers Rail Against Japanese,supra note 36,
at B1; Stephen K. Yoder, Chip Association May Ask Sanctions Against Japanese, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1992, at B7. But see SIA: Sanctions Only as Last
Resort in Japan MarketAccess Dispute, ELECTRoNIC NEWS, Mar. 23, 1992, at 16
(discussing the SIA Board's decision to ask for sanctions if it appears that the
Japanese will fail to satisfy their commitments).
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In 1987 the United States had significantly more leverage
than it has today. The United States had just forced Japan into a
strong semiconductor agreement, sparing Japanese firms from
astronomical antidumping duties. Furthermore, the United
States had never before used sanctions against Japan in the postwar era,201 increasing their significance and effectiveness. The
sanctions remained in place over a four-year period, a relatively
long period of time, and ended just before the current agreement went into effect. Nevertheless, the United States struggled to find a product mix which would not harm domestic
manufacturers. In the end, the sanctions hurt many U.S. electronics companies which depended on Japanese parts to remain
competitive because the Japanese companies restricted supplies
of certain fundamental inputs.2 0 2 While the effect of new sanctions on Japanese companies has clearly diminished, the effect
of sanctions on U.S. companies remains much the same today.
U.S. user industries still depend on Japanese suppliers and the
United States just recently removed the sanctions which caused
the Japanese suppliers to find alternate routes for their products. Renewed sanctions on electronics products, therefore, may
have little effect on the Japanese but a large impact on the U.S.
electronics industry.
Japanese manufacturers have moved several manufacturing
and assembly operations to the United States, in part to avoid
the 1987 sanctions.2 3 The number of American workers the
Japanese employ gives Japanese manufacturers greater political
leverage to combat sanctions. Even if the United States levied
sanctions on imported products, Japanese manufacturers could
evade some of the impact by tailoring the imported products to
the definition of products not subject to the sanctions. 204 In
other words, the 1987 sanctions on electronics products did not
greatly injure the Japanese companies subject to them and renewed sanctions would likely have little effect.
As an alternative to sanctions on electronic products, the
201. TariffHeld to 16-bit CPUs,TV, Drives, T&M Escape,supra note 48, at 8.
202. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
203. Other reasons for the move include diffusing protectionist fervor as
well as typical business considerations. Minoru Inaba, Japanese Firms Stress
Gear'sLocal Content,ELECTRONIC NEWS, Apr. 1, 1991, at 16. See also supra note
58.
204. This prediction envisions Japanese assembly operations in the United
States using components made elsewhere and imported. Several Japanese manufacturers have moved some operations to the United States specifically to
avoid the growing protectionist sentiment. See supra notes 57-58, 69 and accompanying text.
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United States could impose sanctions on non-electronics products. This option also causes problems. Such measures do not
focus the punishment on the Japanese user industries which impede penetration by the U.S. semiconductor manufacturers, and
would provide little incentive for the Japanese electronics industry to buy more U.S.-made semiconductors. As protectionist
pressures have escalated, the United States has threatened sanctions on many products. The same problems apply to sanctions
on other products as to sanctions on electronics: United States
reliance on the Japanese products will hurt the U.S. users or
consumers more than the Japanese producers.
In the end, the SIA might have enough clout in Washington
to persuade the U.S. government to impose sanctions. The semiconductor industry is central to the country's economic, technological, and military strength. The SIA presents a strong and
unified position to Washington and maintains continuous contact with government officials and the press.2° 5 The government
gives some priority to the SIA and its demands.
In sum, the U.S. government faces severe constraints in imposing pressure on Japanese semiconductor manufacturers.
Sanctions imposed for dumping violations may undercut the inroads made so far into the Japanese market. Sanctions imposed
to spur market access may injure the U.S. electronics industry as
they did in 1987.
Ultimately, U.S. semiconductor manufacturers will benefit
most from the 1991 agreement by concentrating on making the
agreement work. They must strive to penetrate remaining Japanese trade barriers, they must gain the attention of Japanese
users by offering innovative and useful products, and they must
consistently meet Japanese demands for quality, timeliness, and
cooperation. With the prospect of sanctions weakened by deteriorating U.S. leverage, the U.S. industry should not focus on the
potential failure of the 1991 agreement, but should work toward
its success.
III.

CONCLUSION

The 1991 United States-Japan Semiconductor Agreement
marks a change in direction from the 1986 pact. It retreats from
205. The Wall Street Journalor the New York Times in any given week is
likely to have at least one story about semiconductor issues. Other electronics
industry associations appear to be much less focused and less unified than the
SIA. The CSPP, while unified, has not maintained much of a public presence
since the U.S. and Japan signed the 1991 agreement.
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the heavy governmental involvement in pricing semiconductors
and allows the market to take control. It builds on the efforts
started in 1986 to encourage greater cooperation between the
U.S. semiconductor industry and Japanese semiconductor producer and user industries.
The success or failure of the 1991 agreement depends in part
upon whether dumping again becomes a problem and how the
two countries react to it. Although growing interdependence of
the worldwide industry may help to diffuse historic tensions, the
1991 agreement will ultimately be judged by the extent to which
U.S. producers gain access to the Japanese market. U.S. sanctions, the impetus for change under the 1986 agreement, would
have little effect given the adjustments made by the Japanese
during the sanctions. The key remains whether U.S. companies
can penetrate barriers despite market share goals and threats of
sanctions. This requires that the U.S. companies put forth a sustained effort. Until the U.S. industry sees sales that demonstrate that it can freely access the Japanese market, tension will
remain high and the relationship, stormy.

